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Essays on Power in Labor Markets
Anna Stansbury
Workers’ pay and working conditions can be determined
not just by the productivity of their labor, but also by power
and institutions. In my dissertation, I examine three aspects
of power and institutions in the U.S. and U.K. labor markets:
1) the wage effects of employer concentration and worker
outside options in the United States, 2) the decline of worker
power and its macroeconomic implications in the United
States, and 3) minimum wage compliance and enforcement
in the United States and United Kingdom. Overall, the three
essays underscore the importance of labor market power
and institutions in the determination of wages—particularly
for low- and middle-income workers. In this summary, I
describe each essay in more detail and conclude with a
discussion of the policy implications.

Essay 1
Employer Concentration and Outside Options
(with Gregor Schubert and Bledi Taska)
In recent years, concerns about employer concentration
have increased. It has been posited as a possible cause of
inequality, low pay, and stagnant pay growth. Antitrust
authorities have been called on to consider employer
concentration in merger and acquisition review, and to
investigate whether it facilitates restrictions on competition,
such as no-poaching agreements. And, since it can be a
source of monopsony power (Berger, Herkenhoff, and
Mongey 2019; Jarosch, Nimczik, and Sorkin 2019), concerns
around high employer concentration have bolstered calls to
raise minimum wages and strengthen collective bargaining.1
In the first essay, we seek to answer the following
question: To what extent does employer concentration matter
for U.S. workers’ wages, and for whom does it matter the
most? We estimate the effects of employer concentration on
average hourly wages across over 100,000 U.S. SOC sixdigit occupation-by-metropolitan-area labor markets over the
years 2013–2016, following Azar et al. (2020a) in measuring
employer concentration with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) constructed from Burning Glass Technologies’ online
job postings database.
Our strategy addresses two common empirical issues,
the first of which is endogeneity. While recent research
has documented a negative relationship between local
employer concentration and wages (e.g., Azar et al., 2020a,b;
Hershbein, Macaluso, and Chen Yeh 2019; Benmelech,
Bergman, and Kim 2018; Rinz 2018), the extent to which
this causal is unclear: employer concentration may be
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correlated with other local economic conditions, which affect
wages. To respond to this, we propose a new identification
approach for the effects of employer concentration on
wages, drawing on shift-share and granular instrumental
variables methodology (Borusyak, Hull, and Jaravel 2018;
Gabaix and Koijen 2020). We instrument for employer
concentration within a particular local occupation with the
predicted change in employer concentration, predicting
each local employer’s hiring with its national hiring in that
occupation. This enables us to construct shocks to local
employer concentration that are plausibly orthogonal to local
productivity, with the key identifying assumption being that
each large firm’s decision to increase or decrease its hiring
nationwide is exogenous with respect to the local economic
conditions in any specific local occupation.
The second empirical issue is market definition. Assessing
the effect of local employer concentration on wages, and
pinpointing the workers who are most affected by it, requires
a good definition of the relevant local labor market for
workers. Using new, highly granular occupational mobility
data constructed from 16 million U.S. workers’ resumes
(obtained by Burning Glass Technologies),2 we show that
occupational mobility is high and highly heterogeneous
across occupations. This suggests that regressing wages
on within-occupation employer concentration—as
much recent research does—without considering the
availability of these outside occupation job options (a) may
obscure heterogeneity, as some occupations are a better
approximation of workers’ true labor market than others,
and (b) may lead to biased estimates, as workers who are
in high-concentration labor markets (within their local
occupation) also tend to have poor local job options outside
their occupation.
To respond to this, we introduce two new factors into
our baseline regressions of wages on within-occupation
employer concentration. First, we allow the estimated
coefficient on within-occupation employer concentration
to vary by occupations’ outward mobility, allowing us to
estimate different effects of employer concentration on
wages for low-mobility vs. high-mobility occupations (for
whom the SOC six-digit occupation is less likely to be a
good approximation to their true labor market).3 Second,
we develop a measure of the value of workers’ outside
job options in other occupations—an “outside-occupation
option index”—and estimate its effect on wages alongside
the effect of within-occupation employer concentration. Our
outside-occupation option index is the weighted average
of local wages in all occupations except the worker’s own,
with each weight the product of (a) occupational mobility
flows to each outside occupation and (b) the local relative
employment share in each outside occupation (building on
work on spillover effects of local outside job options by
Beaudry, Green, and Sand [2012]; Caldwell and Danieli
[2018]; and Macaluso [2019], among others). We use a shift-
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share instrumental variables approach to identify effects of
changes in this outside-occupation option index on wages,
instrumenting for local occupational wages with the leaveone-out national mean wage in outside option occupations.
How much does employer concentration matter for
wages? Our baseline results suggest that while most workers
are not in highly concentrated labor markets, moving from
the median to the 95th percentile HHI (as faced by workers)
results in 2.6 log points lower wages.4 This average masks
substantial heterogeneity: within-occupation employer
concentration matters substantially more for workers who are
less able to find comparably good jobs in other occupations.
For occupations in the lowest quartile of occupational
mobility, like registered nurses and security guards, moving
from the median to 95th percentile HHI is associated with
between 4 and 8 log points lower wages; for occupations in
the highest quartile of occupational mobility, like counter
attendants or bank tellers, our point estimate is zero, and the
confidence interval rules out any decrease in wages greater
than 1.8 log points. A back-of-the-envelope calculation,
using our coefficient estimates, suggests that over 10 percent
of the 110 million workers covered by our data experience
wage suppression of 2 percent or more as a result of
employer concentration. Many of the most-affected workers
are health care workers, reflecting both high health care
employment concentration and low occupational mobility.
We also find a positive and significant effect of an
increase in the value of outside-occupation options, holding
constant within-occupation employer concentration: for
the median occupation, moving from the 25th to the 75th
percentile value of outside-occupation options across
cities is associated with 3.7 log points higher wages.5 This
is economically meaningful: for the median occupation,
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile city by average
wage is associated with a 21 log points higher wage.
Overall, our findings point to a middle ground between
two prominent views about the effects of employer
concentration in the U.S. labor market: employer
concentration is neither a niche issue confined to a few
factory towns, nor does it seem prevalent enough to affect
average wages or inequality to a large degree. The fact that
employer concentration affects wages for several million
Americans, however, suggests that increased policy attention
to this issue is appropriate—perhaps in terms of antitrust,
policies to raise wages, and policies to increase worker
mobility. For these policy decisions, our work underscores
that the definition of the labor market is vitally important.

Essay 2
The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis
(with Lawrence H. Summers)
Since the early 1980s in the United States, the share of
income going to labor has fallen, measures of corporate
valuations like Tobin’s Q have risen, average profitability
has risen even as interest rates have declined, and measured
markups have risen. Over the same time period, average
unemployment has fallen substantially even as inflation has
stayed low, suggesting a decline in the NAIRU. In the second
essay, we argue that the decline in worker power has been
the major structural change responsible for these economic
phenomena.
How could this be the case? Consider an economy
characterized by three types of power, to varying degrees:
monopoly power, monopsony power, and worker power.6
Firms’ monopoly power generates pure profits or rents, and
worker power gives workers an ability to share in these
rents. A decline in worker power can therefore lead to a
redistribution of rents from labor to capital owners. This in
turn can be expected to lead to a decline in the labor share of
income and a rise in corporate profitability and valuations. At
the same time, under this framework (and most other models
of worker power), a fall in worker power would predict a fall
in the NAIRU, as the decline in the cost of labor increases
firms’ hiring, and/or as “wait unemployment” falls (see, e.g.,
Mortensen and Pissarides 1999 and Figura and Ratner 2015).
The above logic makes clear that it is possible that
declining worker power could account for the macro trends
we have seen. The goal of our paper is to address whether
this is empirically plausible. We make our case in four parts.
First, we assemble evidence of the large decline in worker
power in the United States over the past four decades.
Second, we attempt to quantify the decline in worker
power as manifested in a decline in labor rents and show
that it was economically meaningful. Third, we show that
aggregate, industry-level, and state-level changes in labor
rents are consistent with changes in labor shares, corporate
profitability and valuations, and unemployment. Fourth, we
illustrate that falling worker power is at least as consistent—
if not more so—with the data than other explanations that
focus only on rising monopoly power, globalization, or
technological change.
The Decline in Worker Power
In the early postwar decades, there was substantial
evidence of rent sharing in U.S. labor markets: unionized
workers; nonunion workers in large firms or in certain
high-wage industries (like manufacturing, mining,
telecommunications, and utilities); and workers in
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industries with high productivity, profits, or product market
concentration all tended to receive pay premia relative
to observably equivalent workers without each of these
characteristics (e.g., Freeman and Medoff 1984; Brown
and Medoff 1989; Katz and Summers 1989). But each of
these indicators of labor market rent sharing has weakened
substantially over recent decades. The private sector union
membership rate declined from over one-third at its peak
in the 1950s to 6 percent today (Rosenfeld 2014). Since
the 1980s the large firm wage premium has fallen by about
a third (Hollister 2004; Song et al. 2019), and we find a
decline of about one-third in the dispersion of industry wage
premia (as calculated from the Current Population Survey).
In manufacturing, we find that higher revenue productivity
is less likely to translate into higher pay than it was in
the 1960s; Bell et al. (2019) find a similar result for the
profitability-pay relationship. We also find some evidence
of a weakening in the relationship between industrial
concentration and pay across sectors.7
Quantifying the Decline in Labor Rents
How big was the decline of worker power in
macroeconomic terms? We use estimates of the union wage
premium, large firm wage premium, and industry wage
premia from the Current Population Survey to quantify the
magnitude of the decline in total rents going to labor over
1982–2016. We estimate that labor rents declined from 12
percent of net value added in the nonfinancial corporate
business sector in the early 1980s to 6 percent in the 2010s.
Decompositions suggest this decline was largely due to
changes within industries, rather than across industries (as
employment shifted from manufacturing to services). The
decline in labor rents appears in large part to have been
a result of a redistribution of rents from labor to capital
owners, rather than a destruction of rents overall (as a result
of, e.g., rising product market competition).8
Labor Shares, Corporate Profitability, and Valuations
Was the pattern of the decline of labor rents consistent
with the macro trends we seek to explain? For the labor
share, we show that our estimate of the decline in labor rents
is big enough to explain the entire decline in the net labor
share in the nonfinancial corporate sector. At the state and
NAICS three-digit industry level, our measure of the decline
in the labor rent share is also strongly predictive of changes
in the labor share over 1984–2016.
For corporate profitability and valuations, Greenwald et
al. (2019) estimate that the decline in the labor share explains
43 percent of the increase in U.S. equity values since 1989.
If falling worker power can indeed explain the decline in
the labor share, this suggests that falling worker power
can also explain much of the increase in equity valuations.
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In addition, we show that industries with larger declines
in labor rents tended to have larger increases in average
profitability and in valuations as measured by Tobin’s Q.
Finally, for unemployment, we show that states and
industries with bigger falls in labor rents over recent decades
saw bigger falls in their average unemployment rate.
Extrapolation from our coefficient estimates suggests that
the aggregate fall in worker power could be big enough to
explain a large share of the decline in the NAIRU.
Worker Power vs. Other Hypotheses
Prominent recent explanations for the fall in the
labor share and concurrent rise in corporate valuations
have posited a rise in product market monopoly power
(Barkai, forthcoming; Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017, 2019;
Eggertsson et al. 2018; Farhi and Gourio 2018; Loecker
et al. 2020). Yet, replicating Farhi and Gourio’s (2018)
decomposition exercise, we illustrate that a decline in rent
sharing with labor (falling worker power) is just as consistent
with these macro- financial trends as a rise in monopoly
power. Moreover, we show that changes in labor rents at the
industry level have substantially more explanatory power
than changes in product market concentration for changes
in labor shares, profitability, and Q. Indeed, manufacturing
industries have seen some of the biggest falls in labor shares
but minimal increases in (import-adjusted) product market
concentration. Other explanations for the fall in the labor
share focus on globalization and/or technological change
(see, e.g., Elsby et al. 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman
2014; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018; Autor et al. 2020).
But any explanation grounded in perfect competition is
unable to account for the rise in measured markups and
corporate valuations (Eggertsson et al. 2018). Moreover,
the decline in the labor share has been much more
pronounced in the United States than other economies
similarly exposed to globalization and technological change.
Finally, globalization, technological change, and monopoly
power each fail to offer an explanation for the large fall
in the NAIRU. Taken together, these suggest to us that
globalization, technological change, or rising monopoly
power alone lack the ability to explain recent economic
developments in a unified way.
Overall, we conclude that the decline in worker power
is one of the most important structural changes to have
taken place in the U.S. economy in recent decades, in terms
of its macroeconomic impact. Our focus on the decline in
worker power is in line with a long history of progressive
institutionalist work in the social sciences, exemplified
by Freeman and Medoff (1984), Levy and Temin (2007),
Bivens et al. (2018), Kristal (2010), Rosenfeld (2014), and
Ahlquist (2017). Our results suggest that, if seeking to
reverse the decline in the labor share, approaches that focus
on perfecting product or labor market competition may not
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be sufficient. Instead, institutional changes that enhance
workers’ countervailing power may be necessary (but would
need to be carefully considered in light of the possible risks
of increasing unemployment).

Essay 3
Incentives to Comply with the Minimum Wage
in the United States and United Kingdom
(U.K. section cowritten with Lindsay Judge)
The minimum wage is a core protection for workers in
both the United States and the United Kingdom. But it is
only effective to the extent that it is complied with. In the
third essay, partly cowritten with Lindsay Judge, I ask the
question, “What incentive do firms have to comply with
the minimum wage in the United States and the United
Kingdom?” Assuming a profit-maximizing firm has an
incentive to comply if the expected costs of noncompliance
exceed the extra profits that can be earned through
noncompliance (as in Becker, 1968; Ashenfelter and Smith
1979), I estimate firms’ incentives to comply with federal
minimum wage and overtime law in the United States (as
per the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA] 1938), and with the
minimum wage in the United Kingdom (as per the National
Minimum Wage Act 1998).9,10
Compliance Incentives in the United States
In the United States, while minimum wage and overtime
violations can in theory incur large penalties under the
FLSA, in practice, the available evidence suggests that most
violating firms pay relatively little. All (detected) violators
must pay back wages owed to workers. Violators may also
be required to pay up to an equal amount in liquidated
damages, but while this often occurs in court actions, this
appears to occur only rarely in Department of Labor (DOL)
investigations. Repeat and/or willful violators may also be
required to pay civil monetary penalties, but analysis of the
DOL’s compliance and enforcement database (containing
all investigations over 2005–2020) shows that only 11
percent of detected FLSA violations are deemed repeat and/
or willful, that nearly half of these are not required to pay
any civil monetary penalty, and that typical penalties (when
levied) are relatively small: for eligible violators, the median
penalty is around 30 cents per dollar of back wages owed.
Finally, criminal prosecution is rare: there were 10 criminal
convictions for FLSA underpayment during 2005–2016—a
period during which the DOL identified nearly 3,000 willful
FLSA minimum wage and/or overtime underpayments.
What does this mean for compliance incentives? Given
these relatively small costs of breaking the law, typical
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firms would have to expect extremely high probabilities
of detection to have a financial incentive to comply. For
example, the typical first-time violator detected by the DOL
would have to expect a probability of detection of at least
88 percent, and even the most egregious first-time violators
would have to expect a probability of detection of at least
one in three. Higher penalties are levied on repeat violators,
but even then, the typical repeat violator detected by the
DOL would have to expect a probability of detection of at
least 78 percent to have an incentive to comply. The actual
probability of detection is likely much lower than this for
many firms. Given limited resources, even in high-risk
sectors the probability of a firm receiving a DOL inspection
in any given year may be as low as 2 percent (Ji and Weil
2015; Galvin 2016). And while for some firms, the risk of
worker complaints is enough to incentivize compliance,
complaints are often unlikely: workers may be unaware they
are being underpaid, unable to spare the time or resources to
complain, or unwilling to complain for fear of retaliation or
involvement with the legal system.
Compliance Incentives in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, while penalties have increased in
recent years, our analysis of data from government records
and freedom of information requests shows that the total
cost of a minimum wage violation for a typical firm remains
relatively low. All firms caught underpaying the minimum
wage must pay arrears (the wages owed) to the affected
workers. In HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) inspections,
around 60 percent of firms are also required to pay a penalty
worth 100 percent of the arrears (with an additional 100
percent of arrears due if the penalty is not paid promptly); the
remaining 40 percent are offered the option to “self-correct,”
meaning that the firm pays no penalty. In employment
tribunal cases, violating firms may in theory have to pay
substantial penalties if there are aggravating circumstances,
but in practice these penalties are almost never levied. And
while in theory it is possible for firms or individuals to
be criminally prosecuted and subject to an unlimited fine
for severe minimum wage violations, there were only 14
prosecutions between 2007 and 2018 (a period during which
HMRC identified over 7,000 minimum wage violations),
with an average fine of £2,695.
What does this mean for compliance incentives? Under
the HMRC penalty regime, most firms would have to expect
at least a 50 percent chance of being caught (by HMRC) in
order to have an incentive to pay their workers the minimum
wage. While HMRC has substantial inspection resources,
meaning that for some firms the probability of detection
may well be 50 percent or higher, a back-of-the-envelope
exercise using estimates of noncompliance by firm size from
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings suggests that for
the typical firm violating the minimum wage, the probability
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of detection in a given year is between 3 percent and 13
percent. And while HMRC is not the only enforcement
channel—workers can also take a minimum wage complaint
to an employment tribunal or county court—the fact that
firms rarely have to pay any penalty in these settings means
that firms would have to expect near-certain detection for this
channel to represent a meaningful deterrent.
Overall, the analysis in this paper therefore suggests that
for many firms in both the United States and the United
Kingdom, compliance with the minimum wage essentially
rests on firms’ reputational concerns or managerial goodwill.
Viewed from this perspective, it is perhaps unsurprising
that noncompliance with the minimum wage appears to be
common in both countries, with Galvin (2016) estimating
that 16.9 percent of low-wage workers in the United States
experienced a minimum wage violation in 2013, and the
Low Pay Commission (2019) estimating that 22 percent of
individuals covered by minimum wage rates were underpaid
in April 2018. If the minimum wage is to be an effective tool
for ending low pay—while also ensuring a level playing field
for law-abiding businesses—compliance and enforcement
should be a central focus for policymakers.

Summary and Policy Implications
Overall, the three essays in this dissertation underscore
the importance of labor market power and institutions in
the determination of wages. If society wishes to raise pay
for low- and middle-income workers and to reduce income
inequality, these essays suggest a number of possible policy
responses.
The first essay finds that employer concentration
suppresses wages for at least 10 percent of U.S. workers.
Policy responses could include (a) increased antitrust scrutiny
of labor markets, particularly of mergers which increase
local employer concentration for workers in occupations
with few outside-occupation options; (b) targeted provision
of countervailing power through wage floors and/or support
for unions in highly concentrated labor markets; and (c)
policies to expand workers’ outside option set by reducing
barriers to occupational and/or geographic mobility
(such as expanded affordable housing in expensive cities,
reciprocal state recognition of occupational licensing, or
removal of unnecessary barriers to occupational licensing or
certification).
The second essay finds that the decline in worker power
can account for the decline in the U.S. labor share. Reversing
this decline may therefore require policies to reverse
trends in worker power. This could include a strengthening
of formal worker power through support for unions and
collective bargaining, increases in incentives for firms
to maximize a broader conception of stakeholder value
(including workers) alongside shareholder value, or other
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changes in the legal and policy environment that enable
workers to share in the profits generated by their firms.
The third essay finds that the low penalties and low
probabilities of detection give many firms in the United
States and the United Kingdom limited incentives to
comply with the minimum wage. The problem of minimum
wage noncompliance is therefore unsurprising, and may
only become more acute as minimum wages are set to be
increased in both the United States and the United Kingdom.
Increased penalties, alongside increased investigation
resources, are needed to ensure that most firms have an
incentive to comply with these core protections.
Notes
1. Authors making the arguments in this paragraph include,
variously, Bahn (2018); Shambaugh et al. (2018); Krueger and
Posner (2018); Naidu, Posner, and Weyl (2018); Marinescu and
Hovenkamp (2019); Marinescu and Posner (2020).
2. The large sample size—an order of magnitude more than other
data sources—enables us to estimate occupational transitions
reliably between a large share of U.S. occupations. We are
making this new occupational mobility dataset publicly
available.
3. Our use of occupational flows to identify workers’ “revealed”
labor markets builds on Shaw (1987); Manning and Petrongolo
(2017); Neffke, Otto, and Weyh (2017); and Nimczik (2018).
4. Our estimates are consistent with Arnold (2020) and Prager and
Schmitt’s (2019) estimates of the effect of changes in employer
concentration as a result of merger and acquisition activity.
5. We also find coefficient estimates of the effect of withinoccupation employer HHI on wages are biased upward by
around 30–40 percent if outside-occupation options are not
included in the analysis.
6. Monopoly power may arise from barriers to entry or from
innate features of particular product markets, such as
heterogeneous production technologies or short-run fixed
costs. Labor market monopsony power may arise from
employer concentration and/or frictions, and results in an
upward sloping labor supply curve to the firm, enabling a wage
below the marginal revenue product. Worker power—arising
from unionization or the threat of unionization, firms being
run partly in the interests of workers, and/or efficiency wage
effects—enables workers to increase their pay above the level
that would prevail in the absence of such power.
7. The decline in worker power was likely a result of three broad
shifts: 1) institutional changes, as the policy environment
became less supportive of unions and the minimum wage fell
in real terms (see, e.g., Rosenfeld 2014); 2) changes within
firms, as increased shareholder power created pressure to cut
labor costs, leading to wage reductions and the “fissuring” of
the workplace (see, e.g., Weil 2014); and 3) changing economic
conditions, as labor faced increased competition from
technology and from low-wage countries (see, e.g., Levy and
Temin 2007).
8. Specifically: the majority of industries that saw substantial
declines in rents to labor also saw substantial increases in
profits to capital over 1987–2016, and in manufacturing—
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the sector with the biggest decline in the labor share—the
industries with the greatest exposure to low-wage import
competition were not the industries with the biggest declines in
labor rents.
9. This conceptual framework has also been applied to labor
and employment laws by Grenier (1982), Chang and Ehrlich
(1985), Lott and Roberts (1995), Weil (2005), and Hallett
(2018), among others.
10. I focus only on the explicit penalties imposed by the legal
system. While reputational costs also matter for some firms’
compliance decisions (Ji and Weil 2015; Johnson 2020), one
cannot rely only on reputational costs to ensure compliance: if
so, workers at the companies that do not face reputational costs
may suffer from underpayment, and companies that would face
reputational costs from noncompliance may simply be undercut
by those that would not.
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